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TOURO LAWREVIEW
In conclusion, New York State courts have adhered to a two-
prong test set forth by the federal courts when assessing whether
an administrative suspension of a driver's license followed by a
prosecution for an underlying crime of driving while intoxicated
violates double jeopardy.1 8 3  New York State cases are replete
with citations to federal cases which have held that a driver's
license suspension followed by prosecution for the underlying
crime is not violative of double jeopardy. 1" Hence, the state
position is analogous to the federal position and the prompt




(decided February 3, 1997)
Defendant appeals his conviction of the charge of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree, claiming a violation
of his constitutional rights"8 6 and statutory protections against
double jeopardy."8 7 "The defendant had moved to dismiss the
183 id.
184 id.
134 653 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1997). In his first trial, defendant, Kellon
Quamina, was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in
the second degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree. Id. at 613. He was acquitted of the charges in the second
degree, but the jury could not reach a verdict for the charges in the third
degree. Id. A new trial was ordered as to theses charges. Id. Defendant was
convicted at the subsequent trial and appealed. Id.
186 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." Id. Similarly, N.Y. CONST. Article I § 6 states: "No person
shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id.
187 Id. See also N.Y. CriM. PROC. § 40.20. (McKinney 1989). Section
40.20 provides the following:
(1) A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same
offense (2) A person may not be separately prosecuted for
two offenses based upon the same act or criminal based on
the same transaction unless: (a) The offenses as defined have
substantially different elements and the acts establishing one
920 [Vol 14
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indictment under the collateral estoppel doctrine,"" seeking to
bar the introduction of evidence by the People that was used at a
prior trial in which he was acquitted of criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree."8 9 The court denied this motion,"O
and defendant was subsequently convicted.19' The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the lower court's ruling,
holding that there was "no violation of defendant's constitutional
rights or statutory protections against double jeopardy."'9, The
court, relying on People v. Goodman, 93 found that "defendant
failed to carry his burden of establishing that the jury in the first
trial, by acquitting him of the second degree weapons possession
counts, 'necessarily' resolved the issues which the defendant
sought to foreclose in the retrial for criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree."' 94
In Goodman, 1 the court permitted evidence from a prior trial
to be introduced in the subsequent trial. 9 6 The defendant in
Goodman was originally charged with several crimes, arising
from a homicide.197  Testimony of defendant's alleged
offense are in the main clearly distinguishable from those
establishing the others; or (b) Each of the offenses as defined
contains an element which is not an element of the other, and
the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed
to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.
Id. Additionally, section 310.70 provides in pertinent part: "[A] defendant
may be retried for any submitted offense upon which the jury was unable to
agree unless [a] verdict of conviction thereon would have been inconsistent
with a verdict, of either conviction or acquittal, actually rendered with respect
to some other offense." Id.
188 Id.




193 69 N.Y.2d 32, 503 N.E.2d 996, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1986).
194 Quamina, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
195 Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d at 32, 503 N.E.2d at 996, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
196 Id. at 43, 503 N.E.2d at 1004, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
197 Id. at 35, 503 N.E.2d at 998, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 567. Defendant was
charged with murder, robbery, grand larceny, burglary and criminal
possession of a weapon in connection with the death of Elodie Henschel. Id.
1998
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accomplices linked defendant to the crime. 9' This testimony was
admitted at trial,' and the jury was instructed that "the testimony
of any accomplice had to be corroborated by independent
evidence tending to connect defendant with the commission of the
offenses charged."200
Ultimately, there was insufficient evidence presented to convict
on the other charges, 2°1 and the jury convicted defendant only of
grand larceny and acquitted him of the other charges. 2" The
conviction for grand larceny was subsequently reversed,2°3 and a
new trial was ordered pertaining to the grand larceny charge.2
On retrial, the People introduced evidence that the victim had
been beaten to death2 5 as well as statements made by defendant to
alleged accomplices.206 Defendant appealed, contending that
admission of the evidence in the second trial "violated the
principles of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel," 20 7 but the
court affirmed the lower court's ruling,208 relying on Ashe v.
Swenson. 2°9 The Goodman court explained that: "A defendant
19 Id. at 36, 503 N.E.2d at 999, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
199 Id.
20 1 Id. at 37, 503 N.E.2d at 999, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
20' Id. at 41, 503 N.E.2d at 1002, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 572. The trial court
instructed the jury that testimony of accomplices must be corroborated by
evidence independent of the testimony. Id. No corroborating evidence was
introduced by the People. Id. Thus, the jury had to acquit on all charges
except larceny as this charge was sufficiently proved by the Prosecution. Id.
= Id.
2 Id. at 35, 503 N.E.2d, at 998, 511 N.Y.S.2d, at 567. Defendant
appealed the conviction of larceny, and the court reversed the conviction,
ordering the suppression of statements made by defendant to the police. Id.





208 Id. at 35, 503 N.E.2d at 999, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
209.1d. at 38, 503 N.E.2d at 1001, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 570. See Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1969) In Ashe, six individuals were robbed while
playing a poker game. The defendant was acquitted of robbing one of six
victims, due to insufficient evidence. Id. at 439. The People then charged
defendant with robbing a second victim of the poker game and defendant was
922 [Vol 14
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claiming the benefit of estoppel carries the burden of identifying
the particular issue on which he seeks to foreclose evidence and
then establishing that the fact finder in the first trial, by its
verdict, necessarily resolved that issue in his favor."21
Applying the principles set forth in Ashe, the Goodman court
found that the jury had a rational basis for reaching the verdict in
the first trial while not necessarily finding the facts objected to in
favor of the defendant.2 ' Therefore, this evidence was
admissible in the second trial.212 There have been instances when
the court has found previous testimony inadmissible on retrial. In
People v. Acevedo,1 3 the court reversed a lower court's robbery
conviction of defendant, 214 holding that the People's use of a
witness in the second robbery trial was foreclosed by the
collateral estoppel doctrine.215 In acquitting the defendant in a
previous trial, the jury found the testimony of a witness
implausible.2 6 Subsequently, in defendant's trial for robbery, the
convicted. Id. at 439-40. Defendant appealed. Id. at 440. The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the collateral estoppel doctrine was embodied in
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that the
prosecution was precluded from bringing subsequent charges against defendant
for the armed robbery of the other victims at the poker game. Id. at 445-46.
210 Id. at 40, 503 N.E.2d at 1002, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (citing Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1969)).
211 Id. at 43, 503 N.E.2d at 1002, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
212 Id. at 43, 503 N.E.2d at 1004, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
213 69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753. (1987). Defendant
was charged with two counts of robbery involving two robberies of two
different victims on the same day, at the same approximate time, and in the
same area of Buffalo. Id. at 480, 508 N.E.2d at 667, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
Defendant was acquitted in the first trial as the crucial testimony of the alleged
victim was found unconvincing by the jury. Id. at 483, 508 N.E.2d at 668,
515 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The prosecution produced this witness in the second
trial, and defendant was convicted. Id. at 483-84, 508 N.E.2d at 669, 515
N.Y.S.2d at 757-58. Defendant appealed, alleging a violation of the double
jeopardy protections. Id. at 484, 508 N.E.2d at 669, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
214 Id. at 489, 508 N.E.2d at 672, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 672, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 760. Both the
prosecution and defense argued, in their closing statements, that if the alleged
victim's story was to be believed, the jury must convict. Id. at 482, 508
1998 923
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prosecution attempted to admit the testimony which had been
found implausible in the earlier case.2 17 Thus, a reintroduction of
this evidence in the second trial was tantamount to relitigation of
an issue that had previously been determined in favor of the
defendant.18 This is precisely what double jeopardy protections
seek to prevent.
Like Goodman 219 and Acevedom the court in Quaminael
scrutinized the evidence that defendant objected to in order to
determine if the issues were necessarily resolved in the first
trial.nm In the first trial, defendant was charged with two counts
of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.2
M
Defendant was acquitted of this charge. 224 To be guilty of the
charge, a person must possess the weapon and intend to use it
against another.' Defendant was also charged with two counts
of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. 6 To be
guilty of this charge, a person merely has to "possess any loaded
firearm. "227
N.E.2d at 668, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 756. Thus, that the jury acquitted defendant,
the alleged victim's story was not believed. Id.
217 Id. at 483-84, 508 N.E.2d at 669, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
218 Id. at 489, 508 N.E.2d, at 672, 515 N.Y.S.2d, at 760.
219 People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 503 N.E.2d 996, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565
(1986).
nAcevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987).
"' People v. Quamina, 653 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (2d Dep't 1997).
mid.
Id. In the first trial, defendant was charged with two counts of criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree and two counts of criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree. Id. at 613. Defendant was
acquitted of the charges in the second degree, but the jury was unable to reach
a verdict in the charges in the second degree. Id. A new trial was ordered as
to the charges in the second degree. Id.
2 Quamina, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
22 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1989). This section provides
in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree when he possesses a machine-gun or loaded firearm with intent
to use the same unlawfully against another." Id.
n6 Id.
27 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1989). This section provides
in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the
924 [Vol 14
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In sum, as the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects against being tried twice for the same
offense, the Supreme Court in Ashe v. SwensonW also found that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is "embodied in the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy."229 A defendant
may avail himself of this doctrine if he proves that the issues
involved have, necessarily been determined in his favor in a prior
trial. 20 Similarly, in addition to its constitutional protections,
New York State has statutes" prohibiting a party from being
tried separately for two offenses based on the same transaction
unless the elements of each charge are substantially different and
distinguishable, z2 and contrary verdicts would be consistent. 3
In Quamina, since there existed "substantially different elements"
in each count, the court found no double jeopardy violation?24
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM
SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
People v. SteelePI
(decided April 4, 1997)
third degree when.., he possess any explosive incendiary bomb, bombshell,
firearm, silencer, machine-gun or any other firearm or weapon simulating a
machine-gun and which is adaptable for such use." Id.
' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
229Id. at 445.
23 See People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 508 N.E.2d 665, 669, 515
N.Y.S.2d. 753, 758 (1987). See also People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37,
503 N.E.2d 996, 999, 571 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (1986); People v. Berkowitz,
50 N.Y.2d 333, 344, 406 N.E.2d 783, 788-89, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932
(1980); People v. LoCicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 380, 200 N.E.2d 622, 625, 251
N.Y.S.2d 953, 957 (1964).
231 See N.Y. CRmi. PROC. LAW § 40.20, supra note 136. See also N.Y.
CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 310.70, supra note 3.
232 See N.Y. Cmi. PRoc. LAW § 40.20 (2) (a-b) supra note 136.
23 See N.Y. CRIt. PROC. LAw § 310.70 (2) (a) supra note 136.
People v. Quamina, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 612 (2d Dep't 1997).
172 Misc. 2d 860, 661 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1997).
1998 925
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